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EXCEPTION PERCEPTION: THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S STRICT VIEW
OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUCATION ACT
SAMANTHA PERUTO*
“[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. . . .  It is the very foundation of good citizenship. . . .
[A] principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values,
in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Daniel, a young boy from the suburbs of Philadelphia, struggled to
keep up with his classmates in school.2  Daniel exhibited issues with read-
ing and demonstrated problems socializing with the other students.3  His
troubles began in kindergarten, which he attended for two years, and con-
tinued to third grade when Daniel was finally diagnosed with Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and offered appropriate accom-
modations by the school district.4
Thankfully, Congress has developed a statutory scheme whereby
struggling students like Daniel will receive the proper services and educa-
tion from an early age.5  When services are denied, students may seek eq-
uitable remedies, such as compensatory education, to help them attain the
* J.D./M.B.A. Candidate, 2014, Villanova University School of Law; B.S. 2011
Saint Joseph’s University.  This Article is dedicated to the memory of my
grandmother, Beatrice F. Nicoletti, a devoted teacher both inside and outside of
the classroom.  I would also like to thank: my parents for their endless love,
support, and involvement in my education; my brothers, John and Vince, for their
humor, encouragement, and friendship; and the editors of the Villanova Law
Review for selecting this Article for publication and for their generous guidance
and commitment to excellence.
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“In these days, it is doubt-
ful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education.  Such an opportunity, where the state has under-
taken to provide it, is a right, which must be made available to all on equal
terms.”), supplemented by 349 U.S. 294 (1955); see also Perry A. Zirkel, Does Brown v.
Board of Education Play a Prominent Role in Special Education Law?, 34 J.L. & EDUC.
255, 270 (2005) (noting that Brown represents “sea of change in the legal approach
to students that based on group characteristics faced separation or exclusion”).
2. See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 240–42 (3d Cir. 2012) (sum-
marizing facts of student’s struggle through school).
3. See id. (discussing academic and behavioral issues).
4. See id. at 242 (discussing diagnosis and eligibility for specialized services).
5. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006).
(843)
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same level of education as their classmates.6  Unfortunately for Daniel and
millions of other students, those remedies are unavailable when their par-
ents fail to act within the statute’s two-year limitations period.7
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) serves to ac-
commodate and protect the rights of disabled children by requiring pub-
lic educational institutions to “identify and effectively educate” children
with special needs.8  To benefit from the IDEA, children must rely on par-
ents and teachers to recognize their needs and advocate for their best in-
terests.9  Unfortunately, neither parents nor teachers can adequately
advocate in isolation.10  Rather, it “takes a village”—a collaboration be-
tween teachers capable of identifying disabled children (Child Find) and
providing the free appropriate public education (FAPE) to those in need
of specialized services, and parents willing and able to raise a flag when
educational institutions fall short.11
6. See id. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (requiring judges to award “such relief as the
court determines is appropriate”); infra notes 151–57 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing compensatory education remedy).
7. See, e.g., infra notes 55–67 (discussing litigation surrounding this issue and
how courts apply the statute of limitations).
8. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (listing purposes of Individuals with Disabilities Ed-
ucation Act); id. § 1401(3) (amended 2010) (defining “child with a disability” as
“(i) with intellectual disabilities, [hearing, speech, language, or visual] impair-
ments, serious emotional disturbance . . . , orthopedic impairments, autism, trau-
matic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and
(ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services”); D.K. v.
Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting effective education
may require schooling outside public school systems’ and school districts’ duty to
pay for child’s education elsewhere if institution is unable to provide specialized
services (citing P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727,
735 (3d Cir. 2009))); Elisa Hyman, Dean Hill Rivkin & Stephen A. Rosenbaum,
How IDEA Fails Families Without Means: Causes and Corrections from the Frontlines of
Special Education Lawyering, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 107, 116 (2011)
(acknowledging IDEA protection is available to all disabled students, including stu-
dents in public and private schools, and those who are “homeless, or in a hospital,
jail, prison, or foster care placement”).
9. See Erin Phillips, Note, When Parents Aren’t Enough: External Advocacy in Spe-
cial Education, 117 YALE L.J. 1802, 1806 (2008) (noting children lack capacity to
identify disabilities or understand how their needs differ from other students).
The structure of IDEA forces children to rely on “their parents’ willingness and
ability to advocate for them.” Id.
10. See Emily Buss, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 647 (2002) (discussing
relative expertise of parents and educational institutions and need for team ap-
proach to maximize child’s welfare).
11. See Judith Wilson, A Conversation with Toni Morrison, ESSENCE, July 1981, at
84 (statement by Toni Morrison) (“I don’t think one parent can raise a child.  I
don’t think two parents can raise a child.  You really need the whole village.”); cf.
Phillips, supra note 9, at 1823–37 (discussing challenges and responsibilities facing R
both parents and educators in providing most effective education to disabled stu-
dents).  Child Find is the school district’s obligation to identify, locate, and evalu-
ate children in need of special education services. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3).
This obligation is “an affirmative one,” and the IDEA does not require parents to
request an evaluation of their child. See Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia,
401 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“School districts may not ignore disabled stu-
2
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Under the IDEA’s current statutory scheme, parents have a short, two-
year period to request a due process hearing for any alleged IDEA viola-
tions.12  However, the limitations period will not apply under two excep-
tions: first, if the parents were unable to request the hearing due to
specific misrepresentations made to the parents by the local educational
agency (LEA) in regard to resolution of their child’s disability; and sec-
ond, if the LEA withheld information from the parents of the disabled
child.13  Unfortunately, several courts have been reluctant to apply these
exceptions.14
In D.K. v. Abington School District,15 the Third Circuit delineated the
scope of the exceptions to the IDEA’s statute of limitations for the first
time.16  When D.K.’s parents requested a due process hearing and alleged
violations of the IDEA for the school district’s failure to diagnose their
child, they were unfortunately confronted with the IDEA’s statute of limi-
tations, which excluded the parents from claiming any conduct by the
LEA that occurred more than two years prior to the hearing request.17
Consequently, D.K.’s claim was barred because the school district’s con-
duct that formed the basis for D.K.’s complaint fell beyond the two-year
dents’ needs, nor may they await parental demands before providing special in-
struction.”); accord Hyman et al., supra note 8, at 116 n.46 (same).  The duty “is R
triggered when [a school district] has reason to suspect a disability, and reason to
suspect that special education services may be needed to address that disability.”
Dep’t of Educ. v. Cari Rae S., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1194 (D. Haw. 2001).  The
“Child Find” provision includes “[c]hildren who are suspected of being a child with
a disability . . . and in need of special education, even though they are advancing
from grade to grade.”  34 C.F.R. § 300.125(a)(2)(ii) (2000); see Hyman et al., supra
note 8, at 116 n.47 (discussing examples of children exhibiting signs of disabilities,
which trigger Child Find obligations).
12. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C),(D) (outlining timeline for requesting hear-
ing and exceptions); id. § 1415(b)(6) (noting parents may request impartial due
process hearing to resolve any issues “relating to the identification, evaluation, or
educational placement of the child”); Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City
Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525 (2007) (noting issues addressed in complaint resolved
by hearing officer during due process hearing); accord 22 PA. CODE § 14.162(b)
(West, Westlaw through Mar. 2, 2013).
13. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D) (stating exceptions to timeline).
14. See infra notes 55–67 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
courts interpret and apply the statute of limitations exceptions.
15. 696 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2012).
16. See generally id. (recognizing difficulties faced by district courts applying
exceptions to IDEA claims); see also Jim Gerl, Big Decision: Statute of Limitations,
SPECIAL EDUC. L. BLOG (Nov. 6, 2012, 10:05 AM), http://specialeducationlawblog.
blogspot.com/2012/11/big-decision-statute-of-limitations.html (noting Third Cir-
cuit is first circuit to address IDEA statute of limitations); Third Circuit First to Ex-
amine Scope of Two-Year Statute of Limitations in Section 504 Claims, MAIELLO BRUNGO
& MAIELLO, LLP, http://www.mbm-law.net/newsletter-articles/third-circuit-first-to-
examine-scope-of-two-year-statute-of-limitations-in-section-504-claims/2562/ (last
visited Feb. 15, 2013) (noting Third Circuit also first to examine statute of limita-
tions as applied to Section 504 claims under Rehabilitation Act).
17. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (allowing only two years to file request for due
process hearing).
3
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period reviewable by the court, and no exceptions applied to rescue the
claim.18
The Third Circuit held that in order to toll the statute of limitations
under the first exception, the school district must have knowingly and in-
tentionally misrepresented information to the parents.19  Alternatively,
under the second exception, the LEA must have withheld statutorily re-
quired information from the parents.20  For either exception to apply, the
LEA’s conduct must have caused the parents’ failure to request a due pro-
cess hearing within the two-year statute of limitations period.21  The court
also rejected any application of equitable tolling doctrines to the IDEA.22
While giving better guidance on application of the exceptions, the
Third Circuit’s holding is a stringent test, and limits parents’ ability to
overcome the statute of limitations.23  The implications are far-reaching,
as many families are unaware of IDEA violations until it is too late, making
the remedies under the IDEA practically ineffective.24  This decision
places an even higher burden upon parents of disabled children to be-
come more involved, informed, and aware, and to raise and resolve IDEA
issues in a timely manner.25
This article examines how the Third Circuit’s decision will impact fu-
ture litigation of IDEA claims, outlines how parents may successfully navi-
gate the statute’s exceptions to toll the limitations period, and advocates
for a broader interpretation of the exceptions in the future.26  Part II ex-
amines the history of special education in the United States and the devel-
18. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 240–42 (summarizing facts showing teachers allowed
D.K. to continue through school despite difficulties); id. at 245–48 (holding no
exception to statute of limitations applied).
19. For the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the first exception, see infra
notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
20. For the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the second exception, see infra
notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
21. For the Third Circuit’s analysis of causation under the statute, see infra
notes 104–06 and accompanying text.
22. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 248 (providing further discussion of courts’ rejection
of equitable tolling under IDEA).
23. For a discussion of how the Third Circuit’s decision will impact future
litigation of IDEA claims for plaintiffs, see infra notes 111–29, 138–47 and accom-
panying text.
24. See infra notes 138–47 and accompanying text (discussing impact of deci-
sion on parental burdens under IDEA).
25. See generally Phillips, supra note 9 (arguing parents of disabled children R
need assistance to achieve optimal outcomes for their children due to complexities
of IDEA system and child’s disabilities); see also infra notes 138–47 and accompany-
ing text (same).
26. For an analysis of the decision’s impact on future litigation, see infra notes
111–29 and accompanying text; see also Lynn M. Daggett, Perry A. Zirkel & LeeAnn
L. Gurysh, For Whom the School Bell Tolls but Not the Statute of Limitations: Minors and
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 717, 723
(2005) (defining tolling as “the suspension or interruption of the statute of limita-
tions—in other words, temporarily putting the statute of limitations clock on
hold”).
4
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opment of the IDEA.27  Further, Part II addresses how other courts have
interpreted the IDEA’s statute of limitations and its exceptions.28  Part III
explains the Third Circuit’s decision in D.K. v. Abington School District in
greater detail and examines the rationale behind the ruling.29  Finally,
Part IV critically analyzes the decision and provides guidance to practition-
ers, highlights policy issues on both sides of the dispute, and assesses the
strengthened role of parents.30
II. BACKGROUND
While this article examines a limitation on the IDEA, it is important
to first understand the history of special education in the United States.31
Prior to the IDEA—a relatively new piece of legislation—students with spe-
cial needs were inadequately represented in the political process.32  This
section highlights the major changes in special education protection
throughout the twentieth century, which eventually led to the enactment
of the IDEA.33  Further, this section explores the general principles of the
IDEA, the role of parents in a child’s education, and the statute of
limitations.34
A. The Evolution of Special Education in the United States35
Education plays a vital role in the development of society and shaping
the future of the United States.36  Despite its importance, special educa-
27. For further discussion of the development of the IDEA and special educa-
tion law in the United States, see infra notes 37–49 and accompanying text.
28. For an overview of the statute of limitations under the IDEA and interpre-
tations thereof, see infra notes 50–67 and accompanying text.
29. For further discussion of the Third Circuit’s analysis in D.K. v. Abington
School District, see infra notes 68–106 and accompanying text.
30. For an in-depth discussion of the practical implications of D.K. v. Abington
School District for practitioners, students, and parents, see infra notes 107–47 and
accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 35–41 discussing developments in special education legisla-
tion in the United States.
32. See infra note 37 and accompanying text for a discussion of inadequate
special education law in the twentieth century.
33. See infra notes 38–41 and accompanying text for brief highlights of legisla-
tive milestones leading to the IDEA.
34. See infra notes 42–67 and accompanying text for a detailed description of
relevant IDEA provisions.
35. See Phillips, supra note 9, at 1809–13 (discussing developments leading to R
IDEA’s enactment).
36. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (discussing impor-
tance of education in citizenship, culture, and living productive adult life); Phil-
lips, supra note 9, at 1812–13 (discussing Brown decision’s effect on changes in R
educational system in second half of twentieth century); Thomas A. Mayes, Perry
A. Zirkel & Dixie Snow Huefner, Allocating the Burden of Proof in Administrative and
Judicial Proceedings Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 108 W. VA. L.
REV. 27, 36 (2005) (regarding IDEA as “the disability movement’s Brown v. Board of
Education”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5
Peruto: Exception Perception: The Third Circuit's Strict View of the Exce
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-5\VLR504.txt unknown Seq: 6 15-OCT-13 12:25
848 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 843
tion was largely underrepresented in the political arena until the 1970s
and the rise of the disability rights movement.37  A major milestone for
special education and disabilities advocates was Section 504 of the Rehabil-
itation Act of 1973, which disallowed any federally funded program from
discriminating on the basis of disability.38
Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act (EAHCA) of 1975, subsequently renamed in 1990 as
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).39  The IDEA was
the result of a congressional finding that an exorbitant number of dis-
abled children were inadequately educated, including millions who were
37. See Phillips, supra note 9, at 1809 (discussing public’s lack of concern with R
special education until advocates fought to promote rights of disabled individuals).
The 1970s was a decade of progress for special education advocates, especially in
the classroom. See id. at 1809–12 (summarizing evolution of special education ac-
commodation in 1970s).  The movement sought to shift the public’s conceptions
of disabilities away from a medical perspective and towards a focus on using “ex-
isting social arrangements” to help rather than handicap disabled individuals. See
id. at 1809 n.18 (citing RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS:
TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY 169–70, 178–79 (2d ed. 2001) (describ-
ing disability rights movement’s goals and successes)).  “[D]isability policy [prior
to 1970] adhered to the medical model of disability ‘in which people with disabili-
ties were presumed unable to function independently in the mainstream of social,
economic, and political life.’” Id. at 1809 (citation omitted).  Two federal court
decisions reiterated that children with disabilities have equal rights to public edu-
cation as other children. See Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C.
1972) (declaring that financial hardship could not justify denying services to dis-
abled children who are entitled to public education); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Chil-
dren (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
(“[M]entally retarded persons are capable of benefiting from a program of educa-
tion and training.”).  The PARC and Mills decisions also gave parents of disabled
children an opportunity to participate for the first time in the decision-making
process in their child’s education. See Phillips, supra note 9, at 1813 (discussing R
effect of PARC and Mills on legislation and parents’ rights, which Congress previ-
ously neglected).  For further discussion of parental roles in children’s education
under IDEA, see infra notes 45–49 and accompanying text.
38. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 394
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000)) (“No otherwise qualified handicapped in-
dividual . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.”).  Section 504 prompted
a strong societal push towards accommodation of disabled individuals, specifically,
students in public school systems. See Phillips, supra note 9, at 1810 (noting regula- R
tions framed Section 504 as “declaration of civil rights for disabled people”).  De-
spite its success, members of Congress did not anticipate any extraordinary results
from Section 504. See SCOTCH, supra note 37, at 54.
39. See Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-476, § 901, 104 Stat. 1103, 1141–42 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400)
(renaming EAHCA as Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); Phillips, supra
note 9, at 1813 (confirming basic substantive law of EAHCA remained in IDEA R
after changing name).  As of 2012, the IDEA served almost 6.5 million students
with disabilities by providing specialized education services. See Individuals with Dis-
abilities Education Act (IDEA) Data, DATA ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER, www.ideadata.org
(last visited Feb. 16, 2013) (analyzing IDEA statistics).
6
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“excluded entirely” from public school systems.40  Finally, Congress recog-
nized a disabled child’s right to special education, a step beyond Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.41
B. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
1. Principles and Policies
The IDEA is a federal special education statute that offers funding to
state educational agencies (SEAs) that commit to adopt the necessary poli-
cies and procedures to comply with the IDEA’s twenty-five listed condi-
tions.42  In states receiving IDEA funding, schools must identify children
requiring special education services (Child Find) and provide a FAPE to
those students.43  The FAPE must be tailored to the particular needs of
the child through an individual educational program (IEP).44
The IDEA places a strong emphasis on the role of parents in a child’s
education.45  Prior to the IDEA, Congress recognized that schools, acting
40. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2006) (listing reasons why educational needs
of disabled children were not met prior to enactment); Mayes et al., supra note 36,
at 36 (noting number of children excluded from adequate education was
“intolerable”).
41. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (stating purpose of IDEA is to affirmatively “en-
sure . . . the rights of children with disabilities”), with 29 U.S.C. § 794 (forbidding
exclusion on basis of disability for all federally funded programs, not solely educa-
tional institutions). See generally Perry A. Zirkel, A Comprehensive Comparison of the
IDEA and Section 504/ADA, 282 EDUC. L. REP. 767 (2012) (comparing IDEA with
Section 504 and Americans with Disabilities Act).
42. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (listing twenty-five conditions); Mayes et al., supra
note 36, at 36–37 (noting conditions are intended to ensure disabled children in
every IDEA funded state receive FAPE and describing how funds are allocated
amongst state and local educational agencies).
43. See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2012) (describ-
ing IDEA obligations).  “The IDEA protects the rights of disabled children by man-
dating that public educational institutions identify and effectively educate those
children, or pay for their education elsewhere if they require specialized services
that the public institution cannot provide.”  P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester
Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 735 (3d Cir. 2009). See generally Thomas A. Mayes &
Perry A. Zirkel, State Educational Agencies and Special Education, Obligations and Liabil-
ities, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 62 (2000) (describing obligations of IDEA funded
states).
44. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A) (2006) (requiring IEP for students deemed
eligible for special education services); 150 CONG. REC. E2103–02 (daily ed. Nov.
19, 2004) (statement of Rep. Michael M. Honda) (“Every child learns at his own
pace and our educational system must be able to accommodate the needs of each
individual student.”).  The IEP need only be “reasonably calculated to enable the
child to receive educational benefits.”  Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
206–07 (1982).  The IEP is distinct from the FAPE in that an IEP is an offering of
FAPE. See I.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F. Supp. 2d 762, 771
(M.D. Pa. 2012) (describing differences between FAPE and IEP to resolve FAPE
obligation issue in cyber charter schools).
45. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B) (acknowledging parents’ rights also
protected under IDEA); id. §§ 1414(a)(1)–(2), 1415(a)–(c) (parent involvement
in IDEA eligibility determinations); id. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I) (parental consent to
provision of and placement in special education); id. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (parent in-
7
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alone, frequently fail to satisfactorily treat disabled students.46  Further,
Congress found that incorporating parents in the educational process
yields positive results.47  Thus, Congress believed a central parental role
would ensure the effectiveness of the IDEA and each student’s educational
program.48  As a result, the IDEA provides for parent involvement in pro-
cedures including, but not limited to, IDEA eligibility determinations and
requires parental consent to the provision of and placement in special
education programs.49
volvement on IEP teams); id. § 1415(b)(1) (parents’ right to examine all records
related to child and participate in all IDEA meetings); id. § 1415(b)(2)(A) (as-
signing surrogate parents when parents unknown); id. § 1415(k) (providing for
parent involvement in discipline decisions).
46. See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 873–76 (D.D.C. 1972)
(requiring equality of access to education and preference for mainstream educa-
tion after parents challenged statute that excluded mentally disabled children
from education and training in public schools); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children
(PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 302–03 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (same); cf.
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309–12 (1988) (discussing Congress’s need to high-
light parental participation in education because schools typically fail to consult
parents concerning child’s education).  For further discussion of Congress’s find-
ings regarding inadequate education of disabled children, see supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
47. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5) (2000) (“Over 20 years of research and experi-
ence has demonstrated that the education of children with disabilities can be
made more effective by . . . strengthening the role of parents and ensuring that
families of such children have meaningful opportunities to participate in the edu-
cation of their children at school and at home . . . .”); cf. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)
(2006) (adding to 2000 version of statute that “strengthening the role and responsi-
bility of parents” increases effectiveness of education of children with disabilities)
(emphasis added).
48. See Daggett et al., supra note 26, at 728 (“Congress’s purpose in creating R
the IDEA parent role and rights was utilitarian. . . .  [And] essential to the success
of the student’s education program.”); Martin A. Kotler, The Individuals with Disa-
bilities Education Act: A Parent’s Perspective and Proposal for Change, 27 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 331, 362 (1994) (“[T]he history of the Act makes it apparent that policy-
makers viewed parental involvement in decisions affecting the child as the primary
means by which earlier abuses were to be corrected.”).  For further discussion and
analysis of all IDEA provisions concerning parents, see Daggett et al., supra note 26, R
at 728–35.
The high burden on parents under the IDEA is justified because their “strong
emotional attachment to their children and considerable knowledge of their par-
ticular needs make parents the child-specific experts most qualified to assess and
pursue their children’s best interests in most circumstances.”  Buss, supra note 10, R
at 647.  Therefore, control over the education of children traditionally remains
within the family. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that
Amish parents need not comply with compulsory education laws). But see Buss,
supra, note 10, at 647 (arguing that law should not give absolute deference to par-
ents because state interests in educating children and promoting social welfare
sometimes justify interference with traditional parental authority).
49. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)–(c) (2006) (noting parental involvement in IDEA
eligibility determinations); id. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I) (providing for parental con-
sent to placement in special education programs).  For more examples of parental
involvement under the IDEA, see supra note 45. R
8
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2. The Statute of Limitations and its Exceptions
In 2004, Congress amended the IDEA to include, among other provi-
sions, a statute of limitations.50  The IDEA indicates that parents should
request the impartial due process hearing “within 2 years of the date the
parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that
forms the basis of the complaint.”51  This addition reflects Congress’s de-
sire for prompt filing and resolution of IDEA claims and a uniform statute
of limitations across all states.52
50. See Daggett et al., supra note 26, at 766 (discussing all 2004 amendments). R
Prior to 2004, the IDEA did not specify the time limits for filing for due process
hearings. See id. at 748 (noting lack of textual time limits in pre-2004 IDEA).  Ab-
sent federal guidance, most courts borrowed from analogous state statutes of limi-
tations. See id. (noting states could also borrow from analogous federal statutes of
limitations or use equitable principles, but few courts exercised these options).
Courts adopting analogous state statutes generally adopted the torts statutes of
limitations, which are typically two or three years. See id. at 748 n.180 (noting,
however, that tort statutes of limitations are not obviously analogous to IDEA
claims, especially given vast differences in parental roles under IDEA); see generally
Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Statutes of Limitations for Filing Lawsuits Under the IDEA: A State
by State Analysis, 191 EDUC. L. REP. 545 (2004) (discussing each state’s statute of
limitations period prior to IDEA 2004).  However, under the 2004 amendments,
the IDEA still permits states to adopt the state statute of limitations. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(f)(3)(C) (2006) (allowing two year timeline to request due process hear-
ings, “or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for requesting such a hearing
under this subchapter, in such time as the State law allows.”); S.H. ex rel. A.H. v.
Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 487 F. App’x 850, 862–64 (5th Cir. 2012) (adopting Texas
statute of limitations, but same exceptions and other substantive IDEA provisions
applied).
Congress enacted IDEA 2004 on December 3, 2004, but the statute specified
that only certain provisions would take effect on that date. See Individuals with
Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–446, 118 Stat.
2647 (noting all sections, except as otherwise stated, became effective in December
2004).  Others, including the statute of limitations, took effect on July 1, 2005. See
id.  (specifying sections becoming effective July 2005).  Applying the statute of limi-
tations retroactively to conduct occurring prior to July 2005 proved to be a confus-
ing issue for many district courts, but is beyond the scope of this article. See Steven
I. v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 618 F.3d 411, 412 n.1 (3d Cir. 2010) (resolving in favor
of district). Compare Evan H. ex rel. Kosta H. v. Unionville Chadds Ford Sch. Dist.,
No. 07-4990, 2008 WL 4791634, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2008) (concluding IDEA
2004 statute of limitations applied retroactively to claims filed after July 1, 2005,
even if conduct occurred prior to that date), and D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., No.
08-4914, 2010 WL 1223596, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2010) (same), Breanne C. v. S.
York Cnty. Sch. Dist., 665 F. Supp. 2d 504, 511–12 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (same), Sch.
Dist. of Phila. v. Deborah A., No. 08-2924, 2009 WL 778321, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24,
2009) (same), with J.L. v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., No. 06-1652, 2009 WL
1119608, at *10 (W.D. Pa. April 27, 2009) (holding IDEA 2004 statute of limita-
tions does not apply to claims filed after July 1, 2005 where conduct occurred prior
to that date), Laura P. v. Haverford Sch. Dist., No. 07-5395, 2008 WL 5000461, at
*12 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2008) (same), and Tereance D. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 570 F.
Supp. 2d 739, 745–49 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (same).
51. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(e) (2012) (empha-
sis added).
52. See Daggett et al., supra note 26, at 769 (discussing various theories of R
congressional intent behind statute of limitations in IDEA 2004); id. at 749
9
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The 2004 amendments specify two exceptions that limit the applica-
bility of the statute of limitations.53  The limitations period will not apply
when the parents of the disabled child are:
[P]revented from requesting the due process hearing due to—
(i) specific misrepresentations by the [LEA] that it had resolved the
problem forming the basis of the complaint; or
(ii) the [LEA]’s withholding of information from the parent that
was required under this subchapter to be provided to the parent.54
Courts have struggled to interpret these exceptions since their enact-
ment, and many recognize that “statutory and regulatory guidance are
lacking.”55  Several courts have noted the statute’s preference to leave in-
terpretation of “misrepresentations” to the “purview of the hearing of-
ficer.”56  Thus, plaintiffs bear a tough burden of proving that the
nn.182–83 (discussing various limitations periods among several states (citing
Perry Zirkel & Peter Maher, The Statute of Limitations Under the Individuals with Disa-
bilities Education Act, 175 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 6–7 (2003))).  Prior to the IDEA 2004,
state statutes of limitations for IDEA claims varied from sixty days to five years. See
id. at 749 n.182 (surveying court decisions and noting only North Carolina used
sixty-day limitations period compared to longer periods in Third Circuit).  Thus,
the federal statute of limitations shortened the timeline for some jurisdictions. See
id. (noting many jurisdictions adopted three-year timeline).
Moreover, prompt filing leads to prompt resolution, which serves a primary
goal of the IDEA: to provide eligible students with FAPE as soon as possible. See id.
at 769 (discussing legislative intent).  Some argue the short deadline forces parents
to become adversarial very quickly, which makes the educational process and pa-
rental role less effective. See Cory D. v. Burke Cnty. Sch. Dist., 285 F.3d 1294, 1299
n.4 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting court decisions finding short limitations periods in-
consistent with congressional goals).  These critics argue the short timeline dilutes
the “procedural rights’ effectiveness by denying parents sufficient time to consider
and evaluate an adverse decision by school authorities.” Id.  However, Congress
clearly rejects this notion. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (imposing limitations period).
For further discussion of the policy justifications for statutes of limitations, see infra
notes 130–37 and accompanying text.
53. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D) (listing both exceptions).
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. I.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F. Supp. 2d 762, 775
(M.D. Pa. 2012); accord Evan H., 2008 WL 4791634, at *6.
56. 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,706 (Aug. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R.
pts. 300–01).  “We do not believe it is appropriate to define or clarify the meaning
of ‘misrepresentations’ . . . .” Id.; see, e.g., J.L. ex rel. J.L. v. Ambridge Area Sch.
Dist., No. 06-1652, 2009 WL 1119608, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2009), abrogated on
other grounds by Steven I. v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 618 F.3d 411 (3d Cir. 2010).  The
Fifth Circuit noted that Congress properly left educational policies and procedures
in the hands of state and local officials. See S.H. ex rel. A.H. v. Plano Indep. Sch.
Dist., 487 F. App’x 850, 855 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing White v. Ascension Parish Sch.
Bd., 343 F.3d 373, 377 (5th Cir. 2003)). But see Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 252 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that federal district courts
review hearing record “virtually de novo,” despite limited role of circuit courts).
10
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exceptions are met, and courts must undertake a “highly factual inquiry”
to determine whether either exception applies.57
To toll the statute of limitations under the first exception, most courts
required an intentional, knowing misrepresentation, while others allow
mere negligence.58  Courts refuse to allow the action for which the IDEA
claim was brought to be a sufficient action to toll the statute of limitations
because “doing so would allow the exception to become the rule, and the
limitations period would be all but eliminated.”59  However, the Western
District of Pennsylvania allowed mere negligent misrepresentation to toll
the statute of limitations where the school district should have known of the
student’s disability.60
The second exception speaks only of statutorily required information,
which includes a procedural safeguards notification.61  The procedural
safeguards notice includes a full explanation of the parents’ rights under
57. J.L., 2009 WL 1119608, at *4.  The parents bear the burden of proving
that the exceptions apply to the case. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005)
(placing burden of proof “properly . . . upon the party seeking relief”); Mayes et
al., supra note 36 (discussing various circuits’ leading cases on burdens of proof). R
58. Compare Evan H., 2008 WL 4791634, at *6 (“[A]t the very least, a misrepre-
sentation must be intentional in order to satisfy the first [exception]”), and I.H.,
842 F. Supp. 2d at 775 (same), with J.L., 2009 WL 1119608, at *11–12 (allowing
negligent misrepresentation to toll limitations period).  In most courts, a misrepre-
sentation must be more than a merely inadequate evaluation of a student. See I.H.,
842 F. Supp. 2d at 775.  In I.H., the court held that a school district’s inadequate
evaluation of a student, resulting in a failure to accommodate the student’s disabil-
ities, is not an intentional, or even negligent, misrepresentation. See id.
59. I.H., 842 F. Supp. 2d at 775 (indicating that without more, action forming
basis of claim itself was insufficient, but not indicating what additional information
was required); see Evan H., 2008 WL 4791634, at *6 n.3 (“Such an exception would
swallow the rule established by the limitation period.”).
60. See J.L., 2009 WL 1119608, at *11–12 (relying on Pennsylvania law al-
lowing intentional, negligent, or innocent misrepresentation).
61. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(2) (2006) (requiring procedural safeguards noti-
fication to include full explanation of safeguards written in native language of par-
ents and in easily understandable manner).  The notification must contain an
explanation of the procedural safeguards available to parents relating to several
aspects of the child’s education, including “the opportunity to present and resolve
complaints . . . .” See id. (listing all available topics for procedural safeguards no-
tice).  The notice must also include the time period for parents to file complaints,
information regarding the agency’s ability to resolve the complaint, and available
mediation remedies. See id.
Further, the complaint must affirmatively allege the information was statuto-
rily required for the court to apply the exception. See I.H., 842 F. Supp. 2d at
774–75 (refusing to apply second exception where plaintiffs alleged school’s fail-
ure to promptly evaluate child prevented guardians from understanding nature of
child’s disabilities, but did not indicate any statutorily required information was
withheld).  The type of information contemplated under the second exception
does not include information that would have stemmed from an evaluation that
might affect how parents understand the nature of a disability. See id. (holding
information from evaluations insufficient to toll limitations period).  Failing to
promptly evaluate the child is the IDEA violation itself, which cannot be the basis
for tolling the statute of limitations. See id.
11
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the IDEA relating to their child’s education, including a description of the
relevant timelines.62  Parents are entitled to this information in only three
circumstances: “(1) the student is referred for, or the parents request an
evaluation; (2) the parents file a complaint; or (3) the parents specifically
request the forms.”63
Finally, even if a school district misrepresented or withheld informa-
tion, that conduct must have prevented the parents from requesting the
hearing (the “causation requirement”), further limiting application of the
exceptions.64  For example, consider a situation in which a school district
withholds the procedural safeguards notice from parents of a disabled stu-
dent who are entitled to the information.65  Because the parents do not
have the procedural safeguards notification, they are unaware of their
right to request a due process hearing or file a complaint against the
school district and therefore do not request a hearing within the two-year
statutory timeline.66  Under these circumstances, the withholding of infor-
mation prevented the parents from requesting the hearing within the limi-
tations period and the statute of limitations would be tolled under the
second exception.67
62. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (listing required information); see also Kotler,
supra note 48, at 362 (arguing procedural safeguards ensure educators do not act
unilaterally unless informed parents relinquish responsibility). Compare Evan H.,
2008 WL 4791634, at *7 (holding plaintiffs allegations that school district withheld
information not statutorily required was insufficient to toll statute of limitations),
with S.H. ex rel. A.H. v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 487 F. App’x 850, 862–64 (5th Cir.
2012) (holding failure to include required individuals in ARDC meeting consti-
tuted withholding of required information).
63. D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist. 696 F.3d 233, 247 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 20
U.S.C. § 1415(d)).  Unfortunately, unless parents are entitled to this information
in one of the three circumstances, parents are uninformed about the availability of
specialized services for their child. See Evan H., 2008 WL 4791634, at *7 (“Section
1415(d) . . . states how and when a [procedural safeguards notice] must be made
available to parents and details what information such a notice must contain.  It
does not refer to any of the substantive information, regarding specific services
available to a student and a particular student’s educational progress . . . .”).
64. See, e.g., S.H., 487 F. App’x at 862–63 (distinguishing cases where school
districts withheld information, but did not prevent parents from requesting
hearing).
65. See supra text accompanying note 62 (listing circumstances entitling par-
ents to notification).
66. See, e.g., D.G. v. Somerset Hills Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d 484, 492 (D.N.J.
2008) (applying second exception where parents requested evaluation and school
failed to provide procedural safeguards notice, thus denying parents of informa-
tion about right to file complaint or request due process hearing).
67. See, e.g., S.H., 487 F. App’x at 862 (applying second exception where par-
ents were unaware of IDEA procedures).
12
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III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S APPROACH
In D.K. v. Abington School District, the Third Circuit closely scrutinized
D.K.’s entire educational history in the district.68  Ultimately, the court
applied the same strict standard adopted by a majority of district courts.69
The following discussion shows how the Third Circuit used the facts
presented to conclude D.K.’s educational background did not justify any
exception to the IDEA’s statute of limitations.70
A. Facts of D.K. v. Abington School District
In D.K. v. Abington School District, the plaintiffs, D.K.’s parents, ap-
pealed a district court decision, affirming the state agency’s decision that
the public school district did not violate the IDEA by failing to designate a
struggling student as disabled.71  The student, D.K., began kindergarten in
the fall of 2003.72  During his first year, D.K. exhibited difficulties in the
classroom, including both behavioral issues and reading problems.73  The
school district recommended that D.K. repeat kindergarten before mov-
ing on to first grade.74  At this time, the school district’s psychologist
noted that D.K.’s behavior was not uncommon amongst children his age,
and D.K.’s issues did “not necessarily indicate a disorder.”75
In D.K.’s second year, he made little progress with his behavioral is-
sues, despite improved math and reading skills.76  To address these con-
cerns, D.K.’s teachers did not conduct a functional behavioral assessment,
but rather implemented informal behavior plans in the classroom.77
68. See infra notes 70–95 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of
D.K.’s education in the school district.
69. See infra notes 97–98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Third
Circuit’s standard.
70. See infra notes 99–106 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
court’s application of the standard to D.K.’s educational background.
71. See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 243 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting
district court’s opinion that “the [School] District had insufficient reason to be-
lieve that D.K. was a student with a mental impairment”) (alteration in original).
72. See id. at 240 (noting D.K. attended Copper Beech Elementary in Abing-
ton, Pennsylvania).
73. See id. (noting that two school district psychologists, Drs. Suzanne Grim
and Jan Kline, stated D.K. “failed to progress in . . . following oral directions, listen-
ing to and acknowledging the contributions of others, exhibiting self-control, fol-
lowing rules, producing neat and legible work, completing class work [on time],
and using non-instructional time appropriately”).
74. See id. (noting D.K. attended half-day kindergarten program in year one
and full day program in year two).
75. See id. (discussing findings of Dr. Suzanne Grim and school principal Dr.
Jan Kline).
76. See id. (noting D.K.’s difficulty controlling himself, as he experienced
forty-three tantrums in only two months and turned in rushed and incomplete
assignments).
77. See id. (noting behavior plans, including sticker chart and system using
popsicle sticks, yielded beneficial results as D.K. played well with classmates
throughout school year and performed well academically).
13
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D.K.’s parents were optimistic about the behavior plans, but by the end of
the year, both parents and teachers expressed major concerns about
D.K.’s ability to handle a first grade environment.78
Despite those concerns, D.K. advanced to first grade where his behav-
ioral problems continued.79  D.K.’s teachers recommended measures that
D.K.’s parents could take at home to address these issues but did not dis-
cuss the possibility of a formal evaluation.80  A subsequent conference in
December 2005 revealed D.K. was still struggling with behavioral issues but
was not yet a candidate for formal testing because he was not failing
academically.81
D.K.’s parents requested an evaluation of D.K. in January 2006, the
results of which indicated D.K. was not in need of special education ser-
vices.82  Though still struggling, D.K. continued to advance through the
school system.83  He continued to show progress academically, but his be-
havioral interactions with other students remained troublesome.84
78. See id. at 241 (noting concerns about advancing to first grade stemming
from little behavioral progress in second kindergarten year).
79. See id. (discussing parent-teacher conference held only two months after
beginning first grade where  D.K.’s teacher informed his parents that he was copy-
ing work from other students, “was unable to recall instructions, exhibited poor
organizational and planning skills,” and other behavioral issues).
80. See id. (noting conference held in November 2005 for purpose of address-
ing D.K.’s behavioral weaknesses).
81. See id. (noting that D.K.’s teacher told parents that formal evaluation may
be option down the road).  Due to his poor social skills, the school district placed
D.K. in a special social skills group. See id.  The school’s psychologist, Dr. Grim,
claimed D.K. was “on par with” other students in the group. See id.  The social
skills group, however, was not the result of a formal evaluation or diagnosis. See id.
(noting D.K. was not yet evaluated at this time, but parents requested evaluation
later that month).
82. See id. (noting school district did not evaluate D.K. until April 24, 2006).
The school district, through Dr. Grim, administered several tests including a cogni-
tive ability test, a visual-motor integration test, a Wechsler Intelligence Scale for
Children Fourth Edition, and a Wechsler Individual Achievement Test Second Edi-
tion. See id. (describing testing).  Dr. Grim also observed D.K. in his classroom and
used the Behavior Assessment System for Children (BASC) to assess whether D.K.
suffered from ADHD. See id.  The tests revealed D.K. did not need special educa-
tion services because his scores placed him in “average and low-average ranges.”
Id.  At this time, the school did not provide a functional behavioral assessment
(FBA), which D.K.’s parents believed rendered the April 2006 evaluation inade-
quate. See id. at 249–51 (noting inadequate evaluation as one basis of parents’
claims of Child Find violations).  However, the court found the testing legally ade-
quate because the IDEA does not require an FBA under these circumstances. See
id. at 251.  Moreover, the fact that subsequent testing reveals a disability does not
automatically render prior testing legally inadequate. See id. (noting IDEA and
regulations do not require FBA testing during initial testing for suspected
disabilities).
83. See id. at 241 (noting D.K. began second grade in fall of 2006 after his
parents approved results of April 2006 evaluation and signed Notice of Recom-
mended Education Placement form).
84. See id. (noting D.K. fought with other children on playground and bus).
D.K.’s parents disagreed with the school district regarding D.K.’s progress in
14
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Around March 2007, Dr. Linn Cohen, a private therapist, notified the
school district and D.K.’s teachers that D.K. needed special educational
placement and should be formally retested.85  At the end of the school
year, D.K.’s father notified the school district that D.K. had been diag-
nosed with “auditory processing” and “sensory stimulation” problems.86
That summer, the parents requested a second formal evaluation, hoping
for a more comprehensive result.87
D.K. was finally diagnosed with ADHD in September 2007 by a private
pediatric neurological evaluation obtained by D.K.’s parents.88  In Novem-
ber 2007, the school district finally retested D.K. and found him eligible
for special education services.89  On November 30, 2007, the school dis-
trict offered an IEP.90
Pursuant to the IDEA, D.K.’s parents requested a due process hearing
on January 8, 2008, challenging the school district’s conduct since D.K.
began school.91  The state agency hearing officer denied the claims and
the district court affirmed.92  The district court held that the statute of
school. See id. (describing both parties’ opinions on progress).  His parents
claimed that the extra reading and math help D.K. received was insufficient and
that D.K. still struggled academically. See id.  Conversely, the school district be-
lieved he made “considerable progress.” Id.
85. See id. (noting D.K. had been seeing Dr. Cohen since January).  Dr. Cohen
“was ‘[e]xtremely convinced’ D.K. needed special placement.” Id.  The school dis-
trict discussed the results of their prior evaluation with Dr. Cohen, yet she still
recommended re-testing. See id.
86. See id. at 242 (describing parents’ actions at end of D.K.’s second grade
year).
87. See id. (noting D.K.’s parents requested evaluation before beginning of
third grade, but D.K. was not tested until November 2007 by school district).
88. See id. (describing diagnosis and findings).  Dr. Peter Kollros diagnosed
D.K. in September 2007, two months after his parents requested the school’s evalu-
ation, but still months before the school actually performed its own evaluation,
despite the request. See id. at 241–42 (describing timeline of events).  Dr. Kollros
opined, “D.K.’s ‘learning would be enhanced if he were to have the [usual accom-
modations] for children with ADHD,” such as preferential seating, testing in dis-
traction-free environments, and various other supports. Id. at 242.  Still, D.K.
waited two more months for the school’s evaluation. See id.
89. See id. at 242 (noting school district classified D.K. as student with “other
health impairment”). See generally Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
Data, supra note 39 (analyzing statistics of disability classifications under IDEA and
other related statistics).
90. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 242 (noting that while district offered IEP in Novem-
ber, it would not be implemented until March 2008, almost four years after D.K.
began schooling).
91. See id. (noting requested award of compensatory education for September
2004 through March 2008, when D.K.’s IEP would be implemented); supra note 12 R
and accompanying text (describing parents’ right to due process hearing); infra
notes 151–57 and accompanying text (describing compensatory education
remedy).
92. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 242–43 (noting that appeals panel also affirmed hear-
ing officer’s decision and found no abuse of discretion).  Because the parents had
exhausted all administrative remedies, they sought review of the hearing officer
and appeals panel’s decisions in the district court. See id. at 242 (describing deci-
15
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limitations barred plaintiffs’ claims arising from conduct before January 8,
2006, two years before the due process hearing request, and neither ex-
ception to the statute of limitations applied.93
D.K.’s parents appealed to the Third Circuit, arguing that the excep-
tions to the statute of limitations should apply.94  The plaintiffs argued
under the first exception that the school district misrepresented D.K.’s
success by advising D.K.’s parents that D.K.’s issues could be resolved
through alternative means “short of special education placement” (i.e.,
the behavioral plans).95  Under the second exception, the parents argued
the school district’s failure to provide a permission to evaluate form and a
procedural safeguards notice until January 5, 2006 constituted a withhold-
ing of information sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.96
sions at administrative level).  In cases arising under the IDEA, courts give “‘due
weight’ and deference to the findings in the administrative proceedings.”  P.P. ex
rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 734 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982)).  Giving “due weight”
requires a modified de novo review, which considers factual findings from adminis-
trative proceedings to be prima facie correct. See S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist.,
336 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2003).
93. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 242–43 (describing district court’s decision).  The
district court agreed with the hearing officer that the school district did not violate
its obligations to identify students requiring special education (Child Find). See id.
The court reasoned that prior to D.K.’s second evaluation and ADHD diagnosis,
there was no sufficient reason to believe D.K. had a mental impairment because
children develop at different rates, and D.K.’s difficulties were not so pronounced
during his early school years. See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., No. 08-4914, 2010 WL
1223596, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2010).  Further, the court held the school district
did not fail to provide a FAPE before November 2007 because the school was not
required to conduct a functional behavioral assessment during the initial April
2006 evaluations. See id. at *8–9 (finding testing legally adequate).  The court also
rejected the plaintiffs’ request to introduce additional evidence. See id. at *10–11.
94. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 244 (noting parents argued, alternatively, that equita-
ble tolling doctrines should apply).  The parents did not dispute that the statute of
limitations generally would limit their claims to conduct after January 8, 2006 be-
cause they requested the due process hearing on January 8, 2008. See id.  They
merely argued the application of the exceptions and equitable tolling doctrines.
See id. (rejecting application of equitable tolling doctrines); accord Daggett et al.,
supra note 26, at 768–79 (discussing application of equitable tolling doctrines to R
IDEA and related policy issues).
95. D.K., 696 F.3d at 244–45; see also Brief and Appendix Volume I of Appel-
lants at 23, D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2012) (No. 10-2189),
2011 WL 6800592 [hereinafter Brief for Appellants] (arguing behavioral plans
were “inadequately-developed”).
96. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 245, 247 (listing plaintiffs’ arguments under second
exception and noting school district did not provide documents until after parents
requested evaluation in January 2006); Brief for Appellants, supra note 95, at *24
(“[T]he District, in the face of [D.K.]’s well-documented educational needs . . .
failed to provide [the forms] until approximately January 8, 2006 . . . .”).
16
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B. Third Circuit Applies a Strict Standard97
Applying the standard set forth by several district courts, the Third
Circuit adopted the majority view that plaintiffs “must show that the school
intentionally misled them or knowingly deceived them regarding their
child’s progress” to satisfy the first exception.98  Here, the first exception
did not apply because the record showed that the school initiated several
conferences with D.K.’s parents to notify them of his poor performance.99
Moreover, the school’s proposed solutions and suggestion of an evaluation
in the future did not constitute a misrepresentation with an intent to
deceive, but rather an intent to help D.K.100
Analyzing the second exception, the court relied on the statute’s
plain language and only examined whether the parents were denied any
statutorily required information.101  The plaintiffs argued the school’s fail-
ure to provide a permission to evaluate form and a procedural safeguards
notification until after their requested evaluation in January 2006 consti-
97. While this article discusses only the court’s application of the statute of
limitations exception, see D.K., 696 F.3d at 249–53 for the court’s analysis of the
alleged IDEA violations on the merits.
98. D.K., 696 F.3d at 246.  “[T]he alleged misrepresentation . . . must be in-
tentional or flagrant rather than merely a repetition of an aspect of the FAPE de-
termination.” Id. at 245 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).  The court distinguished inadequate evaluations from specific misrepre-
sentations, stating, “Plaintiffs must establish not that the [school’s] evaluations of
the student’s eligibility under IDEA were objectively incorrect, but instead that the
[school] subjectively determined that the student was eligible for services under
IDEA but intentionally misrepresented this fact to the parents.” Id. (alterations in
original) (citations omitted).  Thus, D.K.’s parents could not successfully argue
that a faulty evaluation in April 2006, or a failure to evaluate prior to that time, was
equivalent to the school subjectively determining D.K. was disabled but misrepre-
senting that information to the parents. See id. (describing difference between par-
ents’ argument and standard).
Moreover, the court reiterated the legislators’ preference to leave such deter-
minations to the discretion of the hearing officer. See supra note 56 and accompa- R
nying text (describing statute’s deference to hearing officers and refusal to define
“misrepresentation”).  Therefore, while required to delineate the scope of the ex-
ceptions, the court owed significant deference to the hearing officers. See id.  Such
decisions are only reviewed for clear error. See supra note 92 (describing standard
of review at judicial level).
99. See D.K., 696 F.3d. at 247 (noting numerous conferences held with D.K.’s
parents “specifically aimed” to address D.K.’s issues, implying school’s desire to
involve parents rather than intention to deceive or mislead).
100. See id. (noting school district merely proposed solutions, but did not con-
fidently express such solutions would resolve D.K.’s issues).  The court also rea-
soned that because the behavioral plans did yield some improvement and the
results of those plans were accurately reported to D.K.’s parents, no intentional
misrepresentation could be established. See id.  Thus, the court construed the ex-
ceptions to apply when the school’s conduct works against the progress of the
child rather than to advance the child’s education. See id. (implying intent to help
D.K.).  For further discussion of the court’s multi-factor test, see infra notes 111–13
and accompanying text.
101. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 246–48 (describing statutory language as requiring
“little elaboration”).
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tuted an impermissible withholding of information.102  However, the
school was not required by statute to provide such information prior to
that point.103
Finally, the court added that even if the two exceptions did apply, the
parents could not establish the school district’s conduct caused their fail-
ure to request the due process hearing within the two-year period.104  The
evidence of D.K.’s parents’ request for an evaluation showed they knew of
their right to an evaluation.105  The court established that where “parents
were already fully aware of their procedural options, they cannot excuse a
late filing by pointing to the school’s failure to formally notify them of
those safeguards.”106
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: THE IMPACT OF D.K. V. ABINGTON SCHOOL
DISTRICT ON PRACTITIONERS, POLICY, AND PARENTS
Prior to D.K. v. Abington School District, no circuit court had inter-
preted the exceptions to the statute of limitations so explicitly.107  The
Third Circuit’s decision is thus beneficial to practitioners because it clari-
fies some prior inconsistencies amongst the district courts.108  However,
the decision established a stringent test, which will have the practical effect
of limiting the number of cases in which parents may successfully toll the
statute of limitations.109
102. See id. at 247 (describing plaintiffs’ claim against school district under
second exception).
103. See id. (noting limited circumstances in which information is required);
supra note 63 and accompanying text (listing when parents are entitled to
information).
104. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 247–48 (finding school’s conduct, even if sufficient
under either exception, did not cause parents to delay hearing request).
105. See id. at 248 (noting fact of parents’ “unprompted” evaluation request
indicates knowledge of IDEA procedures and rights).  Moreover, even if the par-
ents were not independently aware of their right to an evaluation, the fact that
D.K.’s teachers suggested an evaluation as a future option imputes knowledge to
the parents of that right. See id. (imputing knowledge of right to parents).  There-
fore, the parents could not claim that their lack of knowledge of the right to an
evaluation caused their failure to request a hearing sooner. See id. (refusing to
allow parents’ purported ignorance of evaluation right to satisfy causation
requirement).
106. Id. at 246–47; accord S.H. ex rel. A.H. v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 487 F.
App’x 850, 862–63 (5th Cir. 2012).
107. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 245 (“[T]he scope of these exceptions is an issue of
first impression for United States Courts of Appeals.”); Gerl, supra note 16 (noting R
Third Circuit is first to address exceptions to statute of limitations, making D.K.
case “a big deal”).
108. See Parents Ability to Extend the Two-Year Statute of Limitations Under the IDEA
Has Now Been Significantly Limited by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, FOX ROTHS-
CHILD EDUCATION ALERT (Oct. 2012), http://www.foxrothschild.com/newspubs/
newspubsArticle.aspx?id=15032387446 (noting significant litigation surrounding
exceptions since statute of limitations added to IDEA in 2004).
109. See id. (noting parents will have great difficulty establishing that excep-
tion to statute of limitations should apply in future cases).
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A. A “Highly Factual Inquiry”: Deconstructing the Third Circuit’s Approach110
To invoke the first exception under this strict test, parents will first
have to show that the school was aware of the extent of the disability or the
adequacy of the proposed solutions.111  Next, the school must have actual
knowledge that its representations of the student’s progress or disability are
untrue or inconsistent with the school’s own assessments.112  The court’s
use of “inconsistent” is vague and undefined, thus leaving room to dispute
any discrepancies found between the school’s knowledge and the informa-
tion communicated to parents.113
The Third Circuit indicated that circumstances showing the school
intended to help the student’s progress promote a finding that the school
did not knowingly misrepresent information.114  For instance, the court
highlighted the fact that the school district conducted several conferences
with D.K.’s parents intending to notify them about their son’s poor per-
formance.115  Also, the parents were kept apprised of all improvements
and challenges throughout his schooling, and the district sought parental
permission and input at every step.116  Considered as a whole, the circum-
stances imply the school wanted to help D.K., not hinder his progress.117
The court did not, however, indicate which facts, if changed, could
yield an alternative result.118  For example, it is unclear whether the court
placed much weight on whether additional conferences were routine pro-
cedure for the school district, or if extra conferences show an additional
110. See supra text accompanying note 57 (describing analysis as “highly
factual inquiry”).
111. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 247 (noting this actual knowledge is required to
show intentional misrepresentation).  If the basis of parents’ claim is a faulty evalu-
ation that did not reveal a disability, the school district could not logically know
the extent of the disability. See id. (finding no misrepresentation where school did
not know D.K. had ADHD prior to November 2007).  Further, parents could not
show the school had knowledge of the adequacy of the behavioral programs. See
id.
112. See id. at 246 (reasoning that requiring actual knowledge of inconsisten-
cies between representations to parents and actual evaluations best represents lan-
guage and intent of IDEA provisions, rather than mere negligence).
113. See Inconsistent Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/inconsistent (last visited July 13, 2013) (defining inconsis-
tent as “lacking consistency” and including synonyms such as “disagreeing,” “dis-
crepant,” and “inharmonious”).
114. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 247 (outlining facts contributing to finding that no
misrepresentation made to D.K.’s parents).
115. See id. (noting teachers’ detailed descriptions of D.K.’s “misconduct, frus-
tration, challenges, and development” to parents).
116. See id. at 240–42 (outlining parental involvement and communication
during early education years).
117. See id. at 247 (noting these facts “fall well short” of type of misrepresenta-
tion required to toll statute of limitations under first exception).
118. See id. (discussing facts in their entirety to support conclusion, but not
indicating which facts were most persuasive or compelling).
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effort to get the parents involved.119  Thus, litigants should closely scruti-
nize the information disclosed in conferences as compared to other facts
or circumstances known to the school that could show a disability, but
were not communicated to the parents.120  Any inconsistencies could ar-
guably support a misrepresentation claim.121
Further, the school district’s expressed confidence to parents that
proposed solutions would be effective helps plaintiffs invoke the first ex-
ception.122  In D.K., the school district proposed solutions but never ex-
pressed any confidence in the effectiveness of the solutions, although they
did yield some improvement.123  The Third Circuit placed significant
weight on the district’s silence regarding the plans’ efficacy, and it further
implied that expressing confidence in the effectiveness of programs that
do not yield favorable results would more likely be a misrepresentation
than no expression of confidence at all.124
The most compelling fact is likely whether the school district suggests
an evaluation might be necessary down the road.125  The Third Circuit
placed great emphasis on the fact that D.K.’s teachers suggested a future
evaluation to impute knowledge to D.K.’s parents of their right to an eval-
uation.126  This suggests that if the teachers did not recommend a future
evaluation, the parents would not have known of their right to the evalua-
tion, thus defeating the rationale used in the Third Circuit’s causation
analysis.127  Moreover, if the district recommended an evaluation and the
119. See id. (discussing conferences).
120. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text (discussing court’s vague
use of “inconsistent” to compare information in determining misrepresentations).
121. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 246 (noting school’s knowledge of inconsistencies is
required).
122. See id. at 247 (“The School District proposed solutions, but it did not
imply, let alone state with any confidence, that these measures would succeed or
eliminate the eventual need for an evaluation.”).  Thus, if the school did imply the
measures would succeed, the balance might have tipped towards a misrepresenta-
tion. See id. (using school’s level of confidence in proposed solution as factor in
determining whether school made misrepresentation). However, stating with con-
fidence would presumably be even more persuasive. See id.
123. See id. (noting behavioral plans did help D.K. improve and school district
reported favorable results to parents).
124. See id. (using effectiveness of behavioral plans as evidence that even if
teachers implied or expressed confidence in plans, no inconsistencies between
teachers’ expressions and actual results justify finding misrepresentation).
125. See id. (noting evaluation suggestion is relevant to both misrepresenta-
tion and causation analyses).
126. See id. (using evaluation suggestion as support for conclusion that no
misrepresentation occurred).  While not necessarily dispositive, the fact of the sug-
gestion indicates the teachers were unaware of an actual disability because no for-
mal evaluation or diagnosis occurred and the teachers were not intending to
communicate to the parents that they had resolved the issue, but rather they were
unsure whether an issue even existed. See id.
127. See id. (noting parents’ knowledge of right to evaluation implied school
district’s failure to notify could not have caused parents’ delay in requesting due
process hearing).
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parents decided to request the evaluation immediately, they would have
been entitled to a procedural safeguards notification explaining the time-
lines for challenging the district’s decisions.128  Then, the parents would
have known of the two-year timeline and would have been able to file a
timely hearing request.129
B. Consistent with Congressional Intent and Public Policy
While the statute of limitations is a tough hurdle to overcome, the
Third Circuit’s approach is consistent with Congress’s intent in adding the
statute of limitations in 2004 and with the general purpose of all statutes of
limitations.130  First, Congress sought to motivate parents to be involved
with their child’s education, and Congress’s imposition of a statute of limi-
tations forces parents to stay involved and resolve issues quickly.131  More-
over, the longer a child remains in an ill-suited educational environment,
the more the purpose of the statute is evaded.132  By setting a two-year
limit, Congress envisioned quicker resolution of these issues so that chil-
dren, the ultimate beneficiaries of the IDEA, would be placed in suitable
programs.133  The Third Circuit’s approach reinforces this deadline, de-
creasing the number of cases falling under an exception and furthering
congressional intent.134
128. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (describing three circum-
stances in which parents are entitled to procedural safeguards notification).
129. See, e.g., D.G. v. Somerset Hills Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d 484, 492
(D.N.J. 2008) (suggesting information about timelines would have helped parents
file timely request); Ravenswood City Sch. Dist. v. J.S., 870 F. Supp. 2d 780, 788–89
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (same).
130. See Daggett et al., supra note 26, at 768–69 (outlining Congress’s intent R
and purpose for adding uniform statute of limitations); see also supra note 52 and
accompanying text for a discussion of congressional intent behind the IDEA limi-
tations period.
131. See Daggett et al., supra note 26, at 769 (discussing Congress’s desire for R
IDEA disputes to be resolved more promptly than other federal litigation).
132. See id. (noting short deadline best serves primary goal of IDEA to provide
eligible students with appropriate programs as quickly as possible).  Moreover,
Congress’s strong emphasis on the parental role under the IDEA is intended to
ensure each student eligible under the IDEA receives the most effective educa-
tional program possible. See id. at 728 (noting consistency between congressional
intent and imposition of limitations period).  Requiring parents to request the
hearing in a short amount of time ensures students are placed into the appropriate
special education programs as quickly as possible because it is typically the parents
requesting the hearing. See id.
133. See id. at 769 (“This choice of fairly short time periods suggests that Con-
gress thought that prompt resolution of IDEA disputes best served the IDEA’s pri-
mary goal of providing eligible students with appropriate educational
programs . . . .”); see also supra note 52 (addressing counterarguments and
problems with shorter deadline).
134. See generally D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2012)
(tightening standards for exceptions to IDEA, thus limiting cases in which excep-
tions apply).
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Second, statutes of limitations are intended to weigh the balance be-
tween protecting the interests of individuals bringing the claims and the
courts’ interests in avoiding stale cases.135  Thus, the Third Circuit’s deci-
sion respects that while parents of disabled children should have their day
in court, they must do so within a limited time to avoid burdening courts
with overdue cases where relevant evidence may be difficult or even impos-
sible to find.136  However, courts should still consider “whether congres-
sional purpose is effectuated by tolling the statute of limitations in given
circumstances.”137
C. Parents Face Higher Burdens, Students Face Harsh Results
The Third Circuit’s interpretation also places a very high burden of
responsibility on the parents.138  It requires parents to be aware of their
rights and responsibilities from the very beginning and quickly file a hear-
ing request at the first sign of any IDEA violation.139  The rule makes two
critical assumptions.140  First, it assumes parents have sufficient knowledge
of the IDEA to be able to recognize a violation.141  Second, it assumes
135. See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463–64 (1975) (“[Stat-
utes of limitations] reflect[ ] a value judgment concerning the point at which the
interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in
prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones.”).
136. See Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (“[Statutes of
limitations] promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims
that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”).
137. Id. at 427 (noting congressional intent is indicated by “the purposes and
policies underlying the limitation provision, the Act itself, and the remedial
scheme developed for the enforcement of the rights given by the Act”).
138. See supra notes 45–49 (discussing active parent role envisioned by
Congress).
139. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C) (2006) (requiring parents to request hear-
ing within two years of date parents knew or should have known about action form-
ing basis of complaint).  If D.K.’s parents requested the due process hearing at the
first sign of a violation, the court would have evaluated the school district’s con-
duct on the merits of the IDEA claims in the two-year period immediately preced-
ing the date the parents requested the hearing. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 244–48
(discussing time period reviewable by court).  However, this assumes the parents
would recognize a potential violation and know of their right to request a hearing.
Cf. id. (imputing knowledge of right to evaluation to parents where teacher men-
tioned future evaluation).
140. See Phillips, supra note 9, at 1823–36 (discussing IDEA’s “dangerous
assumptions”).
141. See id. at 1829–32 (discussing parents’ lack of knowledge about educa-
tional options and disabilities); Stanley S. Herr, Special Educational Law and Children
with Reading and Other Disabilities, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 337, 374 (1999) (noting special
education requires complex and specialized training and services, making few par-
ents competent to effectively advocate for their children); Kotler, supra note 48, at
372–73 (noting many parents are unaware how quickly their children should be
progressing academically, which inhibits their ability to recognize problems).
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parents recognizing a violation would know of their right to a due process
hearing or other remedies.142
The parental burden will have a harsh impact on students without
involved or informed parents.143  While D.K.’s parents were fortunate
enough to hire private therapists, many families without means will not
have the same advantages.144  Moreover, many families go through the
process of filing IDEA claims without a lawyer.145  As a result, they are
unable to establish their case, nonetheless meet their burden of proof to
overcome the statute of limitations.146  Thus, perhaps the Third Circuit
has pushed the statute’s purpose too far—giving parents too much credit
and assuming parents are more involved and informed than practically
possible.147
142. See David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities: Education
Rights and the Construction of Difference, 1991 DUKE L.J. 166, 179 (1991) (discussing
parents’ lack of knowledge about children’s substantive educational rights).  Pa-
rental participation in children’s education seems to be the exception, not the
rule. See id.; see also Buss, supra note 10, at 648 (“[N]ot all parents are this compe- R
tent and self-sacrificing.”); Phillips, supra note 9, at 1823 (noting parents rarely R
request due process hearings).
143. See generally Hyman et al., supra note 8 (discussing how parents without R
access to lawyers and advocates will be most harmed by statute requiring active
parental involvement).  Low-income, poorly educated parents will be most af-
fected, as research shows few school districts comply with the requirement that
procedural safeguards notices be issued in easy-to-read language that may be un-
derstood by persons without a college education. See id. at 132 (citations omitted).
However, placing the burden on parents is consistent with Congress’s findings
about effectiveness of parental involvement. See supra note 47 and accompanying
text (discussing congressional findings regarding parents).
144. See Hyman et al., supra note 8, at 144 (noting low income families cannot R
pay experts or afford services to establish records necessary to win on IDEA claim
at judicial level).
145. See M. Brendhan Flynn, In Defense of Maroni: Why Parents Should Be Al-
lowed to Proceed Pro Se in IDEA Cases, 80 IND. L.J. 881, 881 (2005) (“Should the ability
to pay for the services of an attorney determine which students have a better
chance of receiving [a FAPE] because they can afford an attorney . . . ?  I think we
would all agree that the answer to that question is a resounding ‘no.’”); Hyman et
al., supra note 8, at 113 (“Access to attorneys in the special education realm is R
relatively rare.”).  The national special education bar is small, comprised mainly of
solo practitioners and small firms. See id. at 113 n.22.
146. See Hyman et al., supra note 8, at 144 (“Those families cannot pay ex- R
perts, will not have access to IEEs, and cannot afford to purchase the services on an
up-front basis to establish a record of progress and success.”); see also R.B. ex rel.
F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 942–43 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting
that expert testimony of persons who frequently interact with student, such as phy-
sicians and other service providers, help establish plaintiffs’ case); Pachl v.
Seagren, 453 F.3d 1064, 1067, 1072–73 (8th Cir. 2006) (illustrating how parents
frequently introduce testimony of educational experts to establish case).
147. See Phillips, supra note 9, at 1827–28 (discussing obstacles to effective R
parental advocacy).  The IDEA presumes that parents are both capable of and will-
ing to advocate for children. See id.  However, many parents are reluctant to chal-
lenge school officials, who are presumed to have greater knowledge of educational
programs and effectiveness. See id.; see also Herr, supra note 141, at 366
(“[P]arental participation is often limited because of excessive parental deference
23
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D. Competing Purposes
The Third Circuit’s approach to the statute of limitations renders the
IDEA’s available remedies virtually unattainable to well-deserving students
like D.K.148  Courts fear that interpreting the exceptions broadly will make
the statute of limitations practically meaningless.149  However, interpret-
ing the exceptions so narrowly arguably limits the IDEA’s ability to achieve
its very purpose—to effectively educate children with disabilities by
promptly placing them in appropriate special education programs.150
For example, the equitable remedy of compensatory education is trig-
gered when a school knew or should have known a student was receiving
an inappropriate education.151  Unfortunately, when the statute of limita-
tions interferes—when the parents request a due process hearing more
than two years after the denial of a FAPE—this remedy is unavailable be-
cause the denial of a FAPE alone is insufficient to toll the statute of limita-
tions under either exception.152  Thus, where a school should have
known—or even did in fact know—about a student’s disability, the IDEA
affords no relief absent a showing of a knowing misrepresentation or with-
holding of required information.153
Consequently, a school could prevent plaintiffs from successfully as-
serting the first exception merely by performing minimal evaluations.154
to professional educational judgment . . . .”); Kotler, supra note 48, at 361 (“[T]he
belief that educators have superior knowledge . . . may lead to deference [by par-
ents] to their decisions.”).  Parents are also hesitant to advocate for their child’s
FAPE for “fear of retaliation against the student; a desire to maintain good rela-
tions with the school; cultural norms that place educators in positions of unques-
tioned authority; feelings of shame about having a child with a disability; and a
sense of powerlessness.”  Hyman et al., supra note 8, at 135 n.150 (citations R
omitted).
148. See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 248–53 (3d Cir. 2012) (pre-
cluding award of compensatory education because conduct within two year limita-
tions period did not constitute IDEA violation).
149. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ fear of
broad exceptions swallowing rule).
150. See supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text (discussing purposes and
development of IDEA).
151. See Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 873 (3d Cir. 1990)
(“[C]ompensatory education . . . cures the deprivation of a handicapped child’s
statutory rights . . . .”); Perry A. Zirkel, Commentary, Compensatory Education Services
Under the IDEA: An Annotated Update, 190 EDUC. L. REP. 745, 745 (defining compen-
satory education as “in-kind special education and other related services for deni-
als of a [FAPE]”); see also P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585
F.3d 727, 739 (3d Cir. 2009) (describing circumstances allowing compensatory ed-
ucation remedy).
152. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (noting courts’ refusal to allow
IDEA claim itself to overcome statute of limitations).
153. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 251 n.6 (noting that conduct occurring outside of
two-year limitations period is not even considered in determining IDEA violations
and therefore, no remedy is available as long as limitations period applies).
154. See, e.g., J.S. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 826 F. Supp. 2d 635, 661
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (recognizing Child Find does not require formal evaluation of
24
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Basic evaluations may not reveal any disability at all, which precludes a
plaintiff from arguing that the school knowingly misrepresented informa-
tion about the disability.155  Granted, this argument assumes the school
would take advantage of parents’ tendency to request due process hear-
ings more than two years after the alleged IDEA violation occurred.156
Conversely, if the parents filed within the two-year timeline, the school
might face a tougher challenge.157
V. CONCLUSION
The importance of education in our society is undeniable.158  The
Supreme Court recognized that “[a]n educated populace is essential to
the political and economic health of any community, and a state’s efforts
to assist parents in meeting the rising cost of educational expenses plainly
serves this secular purpose of ensuring that the state’s citizenry is well-
educated.”159  Therefore, in assessing the Third Circuit’s interpretation of
the statute of limitations’ exceptions, it is important to consider which in-
terests should prevail under the circumstances: the legislature’s interest in
providing a free public education for disabled children, or the courts’ in-
terest in excluding stale claims?160
While credible arguments can be made for each side, the Third Cir-
cuit’s test remains.161  Future litigants should take care to closely scruti-
nize the facts of the case, focusing especially on any inconsistencies that
every struggling student); A.P. ex rel. Powers v. Woodstock Bd. of Educ., 572 F.
Supp. 2d 221, 226 (D. Conn. 2008) (noting failure to diagnose struggling students
at earliest moment is not always actionable given difficulty of diagnosing disabili-
ties and experts’ competing definitions of disabilities).
155. See P.P., 585 F.3d at 738–39 (noting while evaluations should be tailored
to student’s specific problems, evaluations need not identify and diagnose every
possible disability). But see G.D. ex rel. G.D. v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 832 F. Supp.
2d 455, 465–67 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (noting evaluation of student with significant be-
havioral problems overemphasized student’s academic success, giving insufficient
weight to behavioral problems, rendering testing inadequate and insufficient to
satisfy Child Find obligations).
156. See supra notes 142–46 (discussing typical barriers to parental action).
157. See, e.g., P.P., 585 F.3d at 739 (analyzing award of compensatory educa-
tion where parents filed within statutorily required timeline).  Because the parents
did not have to bear the burden of proving that exceptions to statute of limitations
applied, the court thus placed more emphasis on whether the school provided
appropriate education to the student in compliance with IDEA principles. See id.
158. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (highlighting education’s R
importance).
159. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983).
160. Compare supra notes 130–37 (describing Congress’s purpose in establish-
ing statute of limitations period in IDEA and purposes of limitations periods in
general), with supra notes 36–49 (describing purpose of IDEA to protect rights of
disabled students). But see Daggett et al., supra note 26, at 739 n.129 (noting IDEA
encourages settlements, which are resolved more quickly, but also sometimes re-
sult in less than full FAPE for children).
161. See supra notes 97–106 and accompanying text (discussing Third Cir-
cuit’s interpretation of statute of limitations exceptions under IDEA).
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may be highlighted to support a finding that the school misrepresented
information to the plaintiffs.162  Further, to effectively advocate for their
clients, attorneys specializing in education law should make an effort to
disseminate knowledge of the rules, to inform parents of their rights, and
encourage prompt filing of complaints.163
Moving forward, litigation of similar issues will likely arise in neigh-
boring circuits.164  For the sake of disabled children, it is essential to raise
awareness of these issues and promote solutions to benefit these stu-
dents.165  After all, “no greater benefit can be bestowed upon a long be-
nighted people than giving to them . . . the means of useful education.”166
162. See supra notes 110–29 and accompanying text (explaining factual
analysis).
163. See supra notes 141–47 and accompanying text (discussing parents’ lack
of knowledge as barrier to effective advocacy and prompt resolution of claims
within two-year timeline).
164. See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 245 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting
Third Circuit was first to address scope of limitations exceptions, but also discuss-
ing inconsistent cases in other circuits).
165. See Hyman et al., supra note 8, at 145–61 (proposing solutions for fami- R
lies without means); Phillips, supra note 9, at 1837–51 (proposing statutory revi- R
sions and supplemental programs).
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